Why did 447 crash

Say that an F detects an incoming ballistic missile. The aircraft can track the missile in real time. But today it may not be able to convey that tracking data all the way to antimissile batteries in time for them to shoot down the projectile. That's the kind of capability the 5G. MIL initiative is aiming for. There are broader goals, too, because future battlefields will up the ante on complexity. Besides weapons, platforms, and gear, individual people will be outfitted with network-connected sensors monitoring their location, exposures to biochemical or radioactive hazards, and physical condition.

To connect all these elements will require global mesh networks of thousands of nodes, including satellites in space. The networks will have to accommodate hypersonic systems moving faster than five times the speed of sound, while also being capable of controlling or launching cyberattacks, electronic warfare and countermeasures, and directed-energy weapons.

Such technologies will fundamentally change the character and speed of war and will require an omnipresent communications backbone to manage capabilities across the entire battlefield. The sheer range of coordinated activities, the volume of assets, the complexity of their interactions, and their worldwide distribution would quickly overwhelm the computing and network capabilities we have today.

The time from observation to decision to action will be measured in milliseconds: When a maneuvering hypersonic platform moves more than 3. Our 5G. MIL vision has two complementary elements. One is exemplified by the opening scenario of this article: the quick, ad hoc establishment of secure, local networks based on 5G technology. The goal here is to let forces take sensor data from any platform in the theater and make it accessible to any shooter, no matter how the platform and the shooter each connect to the network.

Aircraft, ships, satellites, tanks, or even individual soldiers could connect their sensors to the secure 5G network via specially modified 5G base stations. They could also share data via military tactical links and communications systems. In either case, these battlefield connections would take the form of secure mesh networks. In this type of network, nodes have intelligence that enables them to connect to one another directly to self-organize and self-configure into a network, and then jointly manage the flow of data.

Inside the hybrid base station would be a series of systems called tactical gateways, which enable the base station to work with different military communication protocols. Such gateways already exist: They consist of hardware and software based on military-prescribed open-architecture standards that enable a platform, such as a fighter jet made by one contractor, to communicate with, say, a missile battery made by another supplier.

The second element of the 5G. MIL vision involves connecting these local mesh networks to the global Internet. Such a connection between a local network and the wider Internet is known as a backhaul.

In our case, the connection might be on the ground or in space, between civilian and military satellites. The resulting globe-spanning backhaul networks, composed of civilian infrastructure, military assets, or a mixture of both, would in effect create a software-defined virtual global defense network.

The software-defined aspect is important because it would allow the networks to be reconfigured—automatically—on the fly. That's a huge challenge right now, but it's critical because it would provide the flexibility needed to deal with the exigencies of war. At one moment, you might need an enormous video bandwidth in a certain area; in the next, you might need to convey a huge amount of targeting data. Alternatively, different streams of data might need different levels of encryption.

Automatically reconfigurable software-defined networks would make all of this possible. The military advantage would be that software running on the network could use data sourced from anywhere in the world to pinpoint location, identify friends or foes, and to target hostile forces. Any authorized user in the field with a smartphone could see on a Web browser, with data from this network, the entire battlefield, no matter where it was on the planet.

We partnered recently with the U. Armed Services to demonstrate key aspects of this 5G. MIL vision. In March , Lockheed Martin's Project Hydra demonstrated bidirectional communication between the Lockheed F and F stealth fighters and a Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance plane in flight, and then down to ground artillery systems.

This latest experiment, part of a series that began in , is an example of connecting systems with communications protocols that are unique to their mission requirements. All three planes are made by Lockheed Martin, but their different chronologies and battlefield roles resulted in different custom communications links that aren't readily compatible.

Project Hydra enabled the platforms to communicate directly via an open-system gateway that translates data between native communications links and other weapons systems.

Emerging technologies will fundamentally change the character and speed of war and will require an omnipresent communications backbone to manage capabilities across the entire battlefield.

It was a promising outcome, but reconnaissance and fighter aircraft represent only a tiny fraction of the nodes in a future battle space. Lockheed Martin has continued to build off Project Hydra, introducing additional platforms in the network architecture. Extending the distributed-gateway approach to all platforms can make the resulting network resilient to the loss of individual nodes by ensuring that critical data gets through without having to spend money to replace existing platform radios with a new, common radio.

Another series of projects with a software platform called HiveStar showed that a fully functional 5G network could be assembled using base stations about the size of a cereal box.

What's more, those base stations could be installed on modestly sized multicopters and flown around a theater of operations—this network was literally "on the fly. The HiveStar team carried out a series of trials this year culminating in a joint demonstration with the U. Army's Ground Vehicle Systems Center. The objective was to support a real-world Army need: using autonomous vehicles to deliver supplies in war zones. The team started simply, setting up a 5G base station and establishing a connection to a smartphone.

A white 3-D printed box housed processors for distributed-computing and communications software, called HiveStar. The housings were mounted on unpiloted aerial vehicles for a demonstration of a fully airborne 5G network.

The team then tested the compact system in an area without existing infrastructure, as might very well be true of a war zone or disaster area. The system passed the test: It established 5G connectivity between this roving cell tower in the sky with a tablet on the ground.

Next, the team set about wirelessly connecting a group of base stations together into a flying, roving heterogeneous 5G military network that could perform useful missions.

For this they relied on Lockheed-Martin developed software called HiveStar, which manages network coverage and distributes tasks among network nodes—in this case, the multicopters cooperating to find and photograph the target. This management is dynamic: if one node is lost to interference or damage, the remaining nodes adjust to cover the loss. For the team's first trial, they chose a pretty standard military chore: locate and photograph a target using multiple sensor systems, a function called tip and cue.

In a war zone such a mission might be carried out by a relatively large UAV outfitted with serious processing power. Here the team used the gNodeB and S-band radio setup as before, but with a slight difference. There's no good The plane is soon climbing at a blistering rate of feet per minute. While it is gaining altitude, it is losing speed, until it is crawling along at only 93 knots, a speed more typical of a small Cessna than an airliner.

Robert notices Bonin's error and tries to correct him. Pay attention to your speed. He is probably referring to the plane's vertical speed. They are still climbing. On est en train de monter selon lui… Selon lui, tu montes, donc tu redescends. It says we're going up It says we're going up, so descend. Thanks to the effects of the anti-icing system, one of the pitot tubes begins to work again.

The cockpit displays once again show valid speed information. Bonin eases the back pressure on the stick, and the plane gains speed as its climb becomes more shallow. It accelerates to knots. The stall warning falls silent. For a moment, the co-pilots are in control of the airplane. Yet, still, Bonin does not lower the nose.

Recognizing the urgency of the situation, Robert pushes a button to summon the captain. The plane has climbed to feet above its initial altitude , and though it is still ascending at a dangerously high rate, it is flying within its acceptable envelope. But for reasons unknown, Bonin once again increases his back pressure on the stick, raising the nose of the plane and bleeding off speed.

Again, the stall alarm begins to sound. Still, the pilots continue to ignore it, and the reason may be that they believe it is impossible for them to stall the airplane. It's not an entirely unreasonable idea: The Airbus is a fly-by-wire plane; the control inputs are not fed directly to the control surfaces, but to a computer, which then in turn commands actuators that move the ailerons, rudder, elevator, and flaps. The vast majority of the time, the computer operates within what's known as normal law, which means that the computer will not enact any control movements that would cause the plane to leave its flight envelope.

The flight control computer under normal law will not allow an aircraft to stall, aviation experts say.

But once the computer lost its airspeed data, it disconnected the autopilot and switched from normal law to "alternate law," a regime with far fewer restrictions on what a pilot can do. In alternate law, pilots can stall an airplane. It's quite possible that Bonin had never flown an airplane in alternate law, or understood its lack of restrictions. Therefore, Bonin may have assumed that the stall warning was spurious because he didn't realize that the plane could remove its own restrictions against stalling and, indeed, had done so.

Another of the pitot tubes begins to function once more. The cockpit's avionics are now all functioning normally. The flight crew has all the information that they need to fly safely, and all the systems are fully functional.

The problems that occur from this point forward are entirely due to human error. Bonin's statement here offers a crucial window onto his reasoning. When a plane is taking off or aborting a landing—"going around"—it must gain both speed and altitude as efficiently as possible. At this critical phase of flight, pilots are trained to increase engine speed to the TOGA level and raise the nose to a certain pitch angle.

Clearly, here Bonin is trying to achieve the same effect: He wants to increase speed and to climb away from danger. But he is not at sea level; he is in the far thinner air of 37, feet. The engines generate less thrust here, and the wings generate less lift. Raising the nose to a certain angle of pitch does not result in the same angle of climb, but far less.

Indeed, it can—and will—result in a descent. While Bonin's behavior is irrational, it is not inexplicable. Intense psychological stress tends to shut down the part of the brain responsible for innovative, creative thought.

Instead, we tend to revert to the familiar and the well-rehearsed. Though pilots are required to practice hand-flying their aircraft during all phases of flight as part of recurrent training, in their daily routine they do most of their hand-flying at low altitude—while taking off, landing, and maneuvering.

It's not surprising, then, that amid the frightening disorientation of the thunderstorm, Bonin reverted to flying the plane as if it had been close to the ground, even though this response was totally ill-suited to the situation. The plane now reaches its maximum altitude. With engines at full power, the nose pitched upward at an angle of 18 degrees, it moves horizontally for an instant and then begins to sink back toward the ocean. Qu'est-ce qui se passe bordel?

Je ne comprends pas ce que se passe. We still have the engines! What the hell is happening? I don't understand what's happening. Unlike the control yokes of a Boeing jetliner, the side sticks on an Airbus are "asynchronous"—that is, they move independently. The men are utterly failing to engage in an important process known as crew resource management, or CRM. Air France crash — Debris from the flight is seen at an aeronautical laboratory in Toulouse, France, on July 24, Air France crash — Brazilian Air Force personnel unload a body found in the Atlantic after the crash on June 11, Air France crash — The recovered tailfin is unloaded at the port.

Air France crash — Investigators from France and Brazil wait for the Brazilian Navy frigate to unload the tailfin of the air bus. Air France crash — Investigators study pieces of debris in southern France on July 24, Training pilots to deal with a crisis Final moments of Air France crash Book reveals chaos in Air France cockpit The Airbus A went into a sustained stall, signaled by a warning message and strong buffeting of the aircraft, the report said.

The pilots responded to the situation by pointing the nose upward, rather than downward, to recover. The report makes 25 new safety recommendations, on top of a number made in an initial report last year. Some of the recommendations have already been implemented, but it could take years for others fully to come into effect, chief investigator Alain Bouillard told reporters as he introduced the report.

Opinion: Why do planes still crash? The international aeronautic community will likely focus on the crew's loss of awareness of what was going on, Bouillard said.

The doomed jet, weighing tonnes, was in freefall after entering an aerodynamic stall. The ordeal ended in tragedy in the early hours of June 1, reut. French investigators found the crew of AF mishandled the loss of speed readings from sensors blocked with ice from the storm, and pushed it into a stall by holding the nose too high. The BEA investigation agency called for improved training of pilots, instructors and inspectors, and better cockpit design among recommendations to prevent a repeat of the catastrophe.

The crash, which sparked a wider debate about the balance of humans and technology, is seen as one of a handful of accidents that changed aviation.